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Abstract
The controversies on the relationship (or ‘gradient’) between GDP
and subjective well-being oppose those who claim that the gradient
is positive and stable around the world to those who argue that long-
run trends of subjective well-being are flat despite economic growth.
The possible existence of structural breaks of the gradient within the
same country is a challenge to both views. By focusing on the case
of Italy, we show that the long-run trends of GDP and of well-being
turned from increasing to decreasing, and the gradient exhibits a rise
through two structural breaks. Macro and micro analyses explain why
the gradient changes, and we find evidence consistent with the ‘loss
aversion’ hypothesis. In addition, the gradient changed because the
erosion of trust in others, the increase of financial dissatisfaction and
worsened health hinder well-being independently from income.
1 Introduction
Does economic growth go with improving people’s well-being in the long run?
‘Yes’ is the answer of the scholars who claim that there exists a positive and
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stable association (or gradient) around the world between subjective well-
being and income (e.g. Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), Sacks et al. (2012)).
‘No’ is the answer of those who claim that in many countries the trends of
subjective well-being are flat or unrelated to economic growth, which is the
so-called ‘Easterlin Paradox’ (e.g. Easterlin (1974), Easterlin (1995), East-
erlin et al. (2017), Easterlin et al. (2010), Layard et al. (2010)). Still other
scholars argue that economic growth goes with improving well-being over
time depending on certain conditions, such as declining income inequality
and rising trust in others (Oishi and Kesebir, 2015; Mikucka et al., 2017).
The common implicit assumption of such diverse views is that the well-being-
income gradient does not change over time, despite the fact that it may be
either positive, nil, or negative. In this paper, we challenge the assumption
of time-stability of the gradient, and we claim that structural changes can
take place in the trends of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and
of subjective well-being, and in their relationship, i.e. the gradient.
Cyclical changes in the relationship between subjective well-being and
economic growth have already been noticed, and, specifically, a greater gra-
dient has been found when growth is negative, i.e. during contractions
(De Neve et al., 2018). The justification for this finding has been referred to
the behavioural phenomenon of ‘loss aversion’.1 However, this explanation
may not be exhaustive because other factors may be involved in the changes
of the gradient, like changes of income inequality and of trust in others.
Therefore, a more fine-grained exploration is required.
We use macro data for time-series about economic growth and life satis-
faction to investigate whether the gradient is greater when long-run growth,
rather than cyclical change, is negative. Then we use individual level data
drawn from the European Values Study (EVS) and the European Quality of
Life Study (EQLS) for the more detailed exploration of the changes of the
gradient. In particular, we account for the change in the importance that
people attach to income, and for the role of trust in others, of perceived
health, and of financial dissatisfaction, which is a micro proxy for income in-
equality. We employ two micro-econometric techniques: a simple regression
with interaction effects, and the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.
Italy provides a most interesting case study because its economy turned
1‘Loss aversion’ occurs when “the aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of
money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount”
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 279).
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from a remarkable development after WWII, to a no less remarkable long-
run decline that preceded the onset of the Great Recession. These facts
challenge both the estimates of a single rising trend of subjective well-being
of the Italian population over the entire period (Easterlin, 2017; Clark et al.,
2008), and the stability and even the similarity of Italy’s gradient to the
world gradient (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008).
Therefore, a specific investigation of the Italian case can show whether
the trend of subjective well-being exhibits structural breaks, whether the
well-being-income gradient significantly change over the long run, whether
other factors may condition these changes, and also whether the changes in
the importance attached by people to income and to the other factors plays
a role. This investigation is supported by the fact that sufficient historical
data and even individual data (for a few key years) are available for a case
of such great changes in economic development. A better understanding of
these phenomena may also help to identify the main shocks that turn Italy’s
development into a parabola.
One may observe that the simplest explanation of the Italian case is that
subjective well-being is subject to the diminishing returns to income, so that
it can cease to increase after some threshold, and it may even decline, as
some cross-sectional studies suggest Proto and Rustichini (e.g. 2013). Such
observation, however, counters the fact that, after a period of sustained devel-
opment and catching up, the recent economic decline has brought the Italian
economy to diverge from the economic growth of the core of the European
Union (EU).
The structural changes of the Italian economy from the macro-point of
view can be synthesised by Figure 1. Panel A shows a parabola in which
real GDP per capita rises and declines running from 1973 to 2016, so that
it approached the real GDP per capita of the core of the European Union
only in the middle period.2 Panel B shows how subjective well-being (and
specifically ‘life satisfaction’) has changed over the same period in Italy and
in the core of the EU.3 Subjective well-being of the Italian population firstly
exhibits a rising trend, then it exhibits an almost flat trend around the 1990s,
2GDP per capita is at PPP constant 2011 international dollars (World Bank data).
3The data of the figure are drawn from three sources: from the Eurobarometer Survey,
which provides the share of ‘very’ and ‘fairly’ satisfied with life for the entire period, from
the European Values Survey, which provides the average life satisfaction over 0-10 scale
for only 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2005, and from the European Quality of Life Survey, which
provides the same index for 2003, 2007, 2009 and 2016.
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which is the only experience of approaching the European standards, and
finally a declining trend. Structural changes thus emerge for the Italian case
in the series of both real GDP per capita and subjective well-being. But
structural changes seem to emerge also in the relationship between the two
series, i.e. in their gradient. In fact, the decline of Italian well-being begins
well before the onset of the Great Recession, and it seems to be steeper than
the decline of real GDP per capita.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
case of Italy from the macro perspective by going into more formal details
of what Figure 1 suggests. In particular, it shows that the gradient between
life satisfaction and GDP per capita significantly changes twice, thus distin-
guishing three sub-periods of more than 10 years, through which Italy turns
from a growing to a declining country. Section 3 provides an historical per-
spective indicating the shocks that most probably explain Italian parabola to
derive our main testable hypothesis using micro data. Section 4 investigates
what accounts for the long-run downturn by using individual data. It shows
that the rise and fall of income account little for the rise and fall of life sat-
isfaction, because the importance of income for Italians’ well-being changes
even more, and because of the rise and fall of financial satisfaction, of trust
in others, and of self-reported health. Section 6 concludes.
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Figure 1: Real GDP per capita (Panel A) and share of people ‘very’ or
‘fairly’ satisfied with life (Panel B) in Italy and in Europe-8 (Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherland, and the United
Kingdom) in the period 1973-2016
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2 The structural changes in Italy from the
macro perspective
In the studies on the dynamics of subjective well-being, Italy is usually pre-
sented as ‘well-behaved’, i.e. with a rising trend, and positively correlated
with real GDP per capita (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), Clark et al.
(2008), Hagerty and Veenhoven (2003)). However, simple tests on the exis-
tence of breaks in both the trend of life satisfaction and in its relationship
with ‘GDP’ (which stands for ‘real GDP per capita’ hereafter) tell a differ-
ent story: two structural breaks going in the same downward direction can
be detected between 1973 and 2016, namely around 1989 and around 2005.
Table 1 shows the results of simple computations of the relevant changes.
The second column of the table shows that the annual changes of ‘very’
and ‘fairly’ satisfied people with their life turns in 1989 from positive to al-
most flat, and then it turns again to (significantly) negative in 2005. Panel
1b in Figure 1 shows that the pattern of downward looking parabola is con-
firmed by the evidence from two other data sources, i.e. the European Values
Study and the European Quality of Life Survey (see the next section for de-
tails 4). The positive trend for the entire period (fifth row of Table 1), the one
referred to by the opponents of the Easterlin paradox, is misleading because
of the structural break detected in 1989 (Wald test=31.6, p=0.0000) and in
2005 (Wald test=14.7, p=0.0006).
The third column of Table 1 shows that GDP growth is positive in the
first two sub-periods, although decelerating, and it is (significantly) negative
in the third sub-period. The positive trend for the entire period (fifth row)
is again misleading because of the structural break in 1989 (Wald test=67.4,
p=0.0000) and in 2005 (Wald test=281.7, p=0.0000).
The fourth column of Table 1 reports the gradient between the trends
4These two data sources report the average of people’s life satisfaction. The Gallup
World Poll, as fourth data source, reports a significant decline of life evaluation in Italy
from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016 (Helliwell et al., 2017). ISTAT, as fifth data source, confirms
and updates the decline for 2017 with respect to both 2016 and 2010. For the details of
the five sources see:
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Archive/index
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/european-quality-of-life-surveys
https://www.gallup.com/services/170945/worldpoll.aspx
https://www.istat.it/it/files//2018/12/Bes_2018.pdf
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Table 1: The trends of life satisfaction, of real GDP per capita, and of their
gradient in three sub-periods between 1973 and 2016 in Italy.
Time period Annual changes of Annual growth rate Gradient between life
the proportion of of real GDP per capita satisfaction and real GDP
people ‘very’ and ‘fairly’ per capita
satisfied with life (times 100)
1973-1989 0.0080∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
1989-2005 -0.0003 1.44∗∗∗ -0.01
2005-2016 -0.0114∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗◦
1973-2016 0.0017∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
Notes: The results are obtained as coefficients of the regressions of, respec-
tively, life satisfaction against years (I column), the logarithm of real GDP
per capita against years (II column), life satisfaction against the logarithm
of real GDP per capita (III column). Real GDP per capita is at purchasing
power parity in constant 2011 U.S. dollars. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%. The symbol ◦ indicates that the
positive gradient is due to the decline of both life satisfaction and real GDP
per capita.
Sources: Elaborations on data from Eurobarometer, and Maddison Project
Database (Bolt et al., 2018).
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of the two variables. Figures indicate that, between 1973 and 1989, the
proportion of people satisfied with life increases by 0.33 percentage points a
year for one percentage point of economic growth. Between 1989 and 2005,
when economic growth is rather slow, the share of satisfied people decreases,
although very slightly and not significantly. Finally, in the third period (2005-
2016), the share of satisfied people significantly decreases by 0.85 percentage
points per year for one percentage point of economic decline. The gradient
of 0.23% for the entire period (fifth row) is thus again misleading because of
the presence of structural breaks in 1989 (Wald test=19.2, p=0.0017), and
in 2005 (Wald test=61.2, p=0.0000).5
The changes of the gradient may be biased by the short-run changes
of GDP. However, if the trend component of GDP is disentangled from its
cyclical component by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with λ = 6.25 of
smoothness), the results change very little (see Table 7 in the Appendix).
The greater gradient in 2005-2016 compared to the gradient in 1973-1989
indicates that life satisfaction tends to decrease, and at a greater rate, when
the trend of GDP is negative, while it tends to increase less, and at a reduced
rate, when the trend of GDP is positive. This asymmetry makes the economic
decline an even more painful phenomenon for the population, and it clearly
recalls Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s concept of ‘loss aversion’, according
to which people tend to prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains of the
same size. Analyzing a world sample of countries, De Neve et al. (2018)
have recently documented the existence of a greater (and more significant)
gradient during economic decline, but only for cyclical changes. Our results
suggest that ‘loss aversion’ can take place also over the long run.
Compared to the rest of Europe, Italy stands out in some important as-
pects. We first consider the European countries for which historical series of
life satisfaction are available as long as those for Italy, i.e. Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherland, and the United
Kingdom. The trends of this set of countries are broken in a rather different
way. Table 2 replicates the exercise of Table 1 for the (weighted) average
of the 8 European countries. Structural changes emerge also in this case,
but the trend of life satisfaction significantly turns upward (Wald test=47.7,
5The most significant break of the gradient within the entire period is detected in 2007
(Wald test=60.8, p=0.0000), but the test for the break in 2005 is very similar (Wald
test=58.9, p=0.0000). The most significant break of the gradient between 1973 and 2005
is detected in 1989 (as reported in the text), which is the same year as the most significant
break of the gradient between 1973 and 2007.
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Table 2: The trends of life satisfaction, of real GDP per capita, and of
their gradient in three sub-periods between 1973 and 2016 in Europe-8 (Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherland, and
the United Kingdom).
Time period Annual changes of Annual growth rate Gradient between life
the proportion of of real GDP per capita satisfaction and real GDP
people ‘very’ and ‘fairly’ per capita
satisfied with life (times 100)
1973-1997 0.0005 1.72∗∗∗ 0.03
1997-2016 0.0056∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
1973-2016 0.0017∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
Notes: The results are obtained as coefficients of the regressions of, respec-
tively, life satisfaction against years (I column), the logarithm of real GDP
per capita against years (II column), life satisfaction against the logarithm
of real GDP per capita (III column). Real GDP per capita is at purchasing
power parity in constant 2011 U.S. dollars. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
Sources: Elaborations on data from Eurobarometer, and Maddison Project
Database.
p=0.0000) with a gradient that increases (Wald test=51.8, p=0.0000), which
is contrast with Italy.6 In Table 2 the entire period is subdivided according
to the year of maximum break for Europe-8, but if we take the same subdi-
vision as for Italy the results are very similar (see Table 9 in the Appendix).
Therefore, while the performance of GDP does not improve in both Italy and
Europe-8, life satisfaction points in the opposite direction since the 1990s.
The departure of Italy from Europe-8 as a whole is confirmed by com-
paring the heterogeneity of the group of the Europe-8 countries with that
of the Europe-9 countries, which includes Italy. In fact, the standard de-
viations of life satisfaction (normalized with the average) are 0.086, 0.078
and 0.056 for Europe-8 over the sub-periods 1973-1989, 1989-2005 and 2005-
2016 respectively; the standard deviations are are 0.120, 0.085 and 0.104 for
Europe-9. In words, although Europe-9 always exhibits a greater dispersion
than Europe-8, the difference between countries diminishes from the first
sub-period to the second one, but it increases from the second to the third.
6The test for the increase of the gradient in the endogenously determined breaking year
is provided in the Appendix (Table 8) for each country.
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By contrast, the heterogeneity within Europe-8 becomes smaller by moving
from one sub-period to the next.
Therefore, the case of Italy in which the two parabolas of the economy
and of life satisfaction approached Europe-8 at their peak, appears as a pe-
culiar phenomenon of structural change. In particular, the changes in the
gradient between life satisfaction and GDP have pushed Italy in an especially
bad condition compared to other Western European countries. In 2016, Italy
reports the same percentage of satisfied people as in 1983, when GDP was
26% lower; and the gap with Europe-8 would be halved if Italy had main-
tained the gradient of 1975-1989 for the rest of the period considered, despite
the recent deceleration and decline of the GDP.
Second, we compare Italy to a set of Mediterranean European countries
for which data are available. Also in this case Italy stands out exhibiting both
differences and similarities. Greece experienced slow economic growth and
a stagnating life satisfaction until 2009, so that it remained rather distant
from Europe-8. After 2009, the Great Recession hit this country even more
severely than Italy, but life satisfaction declined less severely. The change
in the gradient has thus been much smaller. Spain performed better than
Italy, because the first sub-period of expansion lasted from 1981 to 2008, with
higher rates of growth of GDP. Since this was accompanied by growing life
satisfaction, Spain approached the level of life satisfaction of Europe-8. The
Great Recession hits Spain less strongly than Italy, because both the econ-
omy and life satisfaction declined less. In 2016, the gap in life satisfaction
with Europe-8 is 12% for Spain, while it is 22% for Italy. Portugal main-
tained a large economic gap with Europe-8 over the entire period 1985-2016,
mainly because its initial conditions were especially backward. Despite high
economic growth until 2008, life satisfaction declined, and, after 2008, the
mild recession in the economy was accompanied by a virtually constant life
satisfaction. Fortunately, by looking at the most recent period, life satisfac-
tion has almost doubled, by jumping from 33% in 2011 to 65% in 2016 (see
Table 10 in the Appendix for details).
The case of Italy addresses some general economic issues by challenging
two empirical and contrasting regularities found in the economic research on
happiness: the positive cross-country correlation between life satisfaction and
GDP, so as to fix a stable gradient; and the flat time trend of life satisfaction
in countries which may be growing in GDP. The first empirical regularity
was claimed by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), but it did not convince all
commentators (Krueger, 2008), and it was criticized by Richard Easterlin.
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He and his collaborators in fact have shown that the cross-country correlation
between life satisfaction and GDP would disappear if referred to the trends
over at least 10 years, and that the trend of life satisfaction is not rising
in both developing and developed countries, thus confirming the ‘Easterlin
paradox’ (Easterlin et al., 2010).7
This section challenges both empirical regularities by considering the pos-
sible changes of the trends in a same country. The case of Italy in fact shows
that such changes can be substantial, and that the trend of life satisfaction
over periods of more than 10 years can be either rising with GDP, or flat, or
declining. The downward arm of this pattern suggests, in contrast with the
core of Europe, that the ‘decreasing returns to income’ cannot be a sufficient
explanation, and the fact that such downward arm began around 1989 and
prolongs for almost 30 years suggests that the Great Recession cannot be a
sufficient explanation either. A deep-rooted investigation is thus needed.
3 A brief historical analysis
Which shocks may have turned economic growth into economic decline? An-
swering this question goes beyond the scope of the paper, and it would take
us too far. However, a brief account of the main historical facts concerning
possible shocks can help us to interpret the gradient in the light of the ‘loss
aversion’ hypothesis.
The turn of Italy’s parabola was prepared by three key facts: (i) in the
1970s, unions claimed higher, price-indexed, and more equal wages, after
several years in which wage share shrank; (ii) in the 1980s, relaxed fiscal pol-
icy, including social expenditure, inflated Italy’s income growth by increasing
public debt; (iii) during both decades, Italy and other European countries
made several progressively more demanding attempts to build a common
area of free trade. To this aim, a quasi-fixed regime of foreign exchange rates
(the European Monetary System) was established.
7The ‘Easterlin paradox’ arose from the pioneering 1974 and 1995 Easterlin’ s articles,
and it states that at a point in time happiness varies directly with income both among
and within nations, but over time happiness does not trend upward as income continues
to grow. “Happiness” is used here interchangeably with subjective well-being as a proxy
for all evaluative measures of selfreported feelings of well-being, including life satisfaction
[· · · ]. “Income” is a proxy for real GDP per capita, the standard unitary measure of
economic growth’ (Easterlin, 2017).
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In the 1990s, Italy was hit by a number of dramatic shocks, i.e. economic,
political, judicial, and criminal ones. In particular, after the foreign exchange
regime was subject to international disruptive forces, the Italian Lira was
repeatedly attacked by speculators in 1992, so that it exited that regime and
severely devalued.8 The reaction of the government was similarly dramatic,
because the primary balance of the public sector was reversed in a very short
time from largely negative since many years to largely positive from then on.
Secondly, labour market reforms brought Italy rapidly closer to Europe by
making labour far more flexible.
These two shocks had the effect of tightening people, except the richest,
in a grip: the fiscal restriction put people in conditions of greater economic
needs, while labour flexibilisation made needs satisfaction more uncertain.
People thus experienced a dramatic reversal of the tendency to less income
inequality. In fact, while from the 1970s the Gini index steeply declined, in
the 1990s it steeply increased. People further experienced more competition
in the labour market just when public safety net was weakened, thus chal-
lenging their trust in others. Therefore, when people realised that the world
around them had changed, they cumulated various reasons for experiencing
a greater reduction in their life satisfaction than in their income, i.e a greater
well-being-income gradient.
In sum, by looking at historical facts, we expect a confirmation of the ‘loss
aversion’ hypothesis, i.e. that people suffer more a 1% of income decline than
they enjoy a 1% of income growth. In particular, we expect that people’s
preferences for income increase when the trend of GDP declines because
people experience increasing uncertainty about the future, and worsening
economic conditions. However, the interpretation based on loss aversion
requires that other things remain constant, which is difficult to maintain in
the long run. Hence, in the next section, we will use micro data to put our
expectation to a test. In particular, we will account for the change in the
social context by focusing on the changes of trust in others and of financial
dissatisfaction as individual level proxy for income inequality.
8In the same year, the traditional parties lost the elections, many politicians were
prosecuted for corruption, and two magistrates who led investigations on the mafia were
killed.
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4 Explaining life satisfaction in Italy: evi-
dence from micro data
Individual level data for Italy are available for some key-years of the period
under examination: the European Values Study provides a dataset for 1981,
1990, and 2005, and the European Quality of Life Survey which covers the
period from 2003 to 2016. We adopt two econometric approaches: the first
one is a standard OLS regression in which we regress life satisfaction over
income, year, their interaction and a standard set of control variables. The
equation is as follows:
LSi = α + β1 · Incomei + β2 · Y ear + β3 · Incomei · Y ear +Θ ·Xi + ε (1)
where LS stands for life satisfaction; the subscript i indicates individuals;
Xi is a vector of control variables including age, age squared, gender, educa-
tion, marital status, subjective health, and occupational status, and Θ is the
corresponding vector of coefficients; Y ear is a variable that includes all the
years when the surveys have been administered. The regression uses sample
weights and robust standard errors clustered by year.
The coefficient β3 indicates how the relationship between income and life
satisfaction changes over time. Thus, it allows us to check whether income
has become more significantly associated to life satisfaction in correspondence
with the decline of the Italian economy. However, as discussed in section
3, well-being in Italy might have changed because of changes in the social
context, or precisely, of how this is perceived by people. To account for this
change, we extend equation 1 to include measures of trust in others and of
financial dissatisfaction.
In order to study the relative contributions of income, trust in others,
and of financial dissatisfaction to the changes of life satisfaction, we adopt
a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. In the early 1970s, Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973) independently developed a technique to study discrimination
between men and women in the labour market. Since then, the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition has been applied in many disciplines, including the
literature on subjective well-being (Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh, 2010;
Becchetti et al., 2014). In our case, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is
valuable to explain the changes in well-being as it allows to account for two
possible sources of changes at the same time: first, the amount of a correlate
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of life satisfaction may change – e.g. income increased over time; second, the
association between independent variables and life satisfaction may change –
e.g. the correlation of income and life satisfaction increased over time. If we
consider life satisfaction as a proxy for utility, this amounts to recognizing
that people’s preferences may change over time.
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition uses individual level data to decom-
pose the difference (or gap) in life satisfaction between two points in time.
In our case, the two points in time are the years delimiting the sub-periods
in which we observe structural breaks (1989 and 2005). The life satisfaction
difference is decomposed in two parts: the explained one, which accounts
for differences in observed characteristics of the sample and the unexplained
one, which considers the differences in the coefficients between the two groups
(Jann, 2008). In other words, the decomposition allows us to establish how
much of the overall difference in the average life satisfaction between two
years can be attributed to changes in the set of variables as presented in
equation 2 (the explained part) and to changes in how these variables are
associated to well-being (the unexplained part).
The ordered nature of the dependent variable requires methods for cate-
gorical variables. However, we chose a linear model for ease of computation
and comparison of the coefficients across years. Moreover, the literature on
subjective well-being showed that, in presence of a sufficient number of cat-
egories, linear models and their ordered counterparts provide qualitatively
equivalent results. In particular, Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) con-
clude that assumptions on ordinality or cardinality of the answers to a sub-
jective well-being question are “relatively unimportant to results”9.
Formally, the decomposition is as follows:
∆LS = [E(Xfy)− E(Xiy)]
′ · β∗
︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained
+ [E(Xfy)
′ · (βfy − β
∗) + E(Xiy)
′ · (β∗ − βiy)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained
(2)
where ∆LS is the gap in average subjective well-being between the final
(fy) and the initial (iy) year of observations, E(X) is the yearly average
(across individuals) of a vector of independent variables measured at the
beginning and at the end of the period of observation, βfy and βiy are vectors
of coefficients and β∗ is a vector of non-discriminatory coefficients to quantify
9Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004, p. 655).
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how much each group of variables explains the overall gap. The coefficients
β∗ are estimated by pooling the observations of the final and initial years.
In a second step, we extend equation 1 and 2 to account for trust in others
and financial dissatisfaction. These additional control variables allow us to
check whether the role of income is robust to controlling for two of the main
explanations of the change in well-being provided so far in the literature,
namely the erosion of social capital (Bartolini and Bonatti, 2008; Bartolini
et al., 2013; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015) and adaptation to past and others’
income (Layard et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2017; Clark and Georgellis, 2010).
We provide a detailed description of the variables of interest in section 4.1.
Unfortunately, there is no single source of individual level data that allows
us to study Italians’ well-being since the early 1970s. However, it is possi-
ble to use two separate data-sets covering respectively the period 1981-2005
(European Value Study data) and 2003-2016 (European Quality of Life Sur-
vey data). The changes in life satisfaction from these two data-sets confirm
the trend indicated by Eurobarometer data (see Figure 1b). Yet, compared
to Eurobarometer, these two surveys provide a rich set of harmonized and
nationally representative data over time.
4.1 Data
4.1.1 European Values Study (1981-2005)
The EVS (2011) is a compilation of internationally comparable surveys col-
lecting information on many aspects of people’s lives including economic,
social, cultural and political issues. Each survey provides nationally repre-
sentative samples of the population of European countries. The survey has
been administered in Italy in years 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2005. The sample
comprises about 1000 observations per wave sampled according to multi-stage
stratified sampling (EVS, 2011).
Our proxy for well-being is life satisfaction as observed through answers
to the question: “all things considered, how satisfied are you with your life
as a whole these days?”. Answers range from 1 = “dissatisfied” to 10 =
“satisfied”. The EVS provides also another proxy for well-being, happiness.
However, we focus only on the former variable for two main reasons: i. life
satisfaction (1-10 points scale) provides better and more differentiated in-
formation than happiness (1-4 points scale); ii. despite the fact that the
evidence from the two variables is often consistent, happiness is usually re-
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garded as a more emotional measure of well-being, whereas life satisfaction
is considered a more cognitive evaluation of well-being. Hence, the second is
usually regarded as a more reliable proxy for well-being (Diener, 2006).
Figure 2 represents the changes of life satisfaction over time along with
economic growth. The curves confirm the observation from Eurobarometer
data (see Figure 1) that the gradient between life satisfaction and economic
growth changes in the 1990s. Thus in our analysis we will focus on the
sub-periods 1981-1990, and 1990-2005. Unfortunately, the European Values
Study does not cover the period up to 2016. This is why, later in the paper,
we will turn our attention to the European Quality of Life Study which,
instead, covers the period 2003-2016.
Figure 2: Trends of GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) and life satisfaction.
25
00
0
30
00
0
35
00
0
40
00
0
G
DP
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 (c
on
sta
nt 
20
10
 U
S$
)
6
6.
5
7
7.
5
8
Av
er
ag
e 
life
 s
at
isf
ac
tio
n
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
 
life satisfaction (EVS) life satisfaction (EQLS)
95% C.I. GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$)
Note: Figures about life satisfaction from 1981 to 2005 are from the EVS.
Figures from 2003 to 2016 are from the EQLS, which is described in section
4.1.2.
Household income, financial dissatisfaction and trust in others are the
three main independent variables. Income is measured through respondents’
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declaration of their own household income. Respondents are asked to place
themselves on a scale from 1 to 10 where each point corresponds to a specific
income bracket. For present analysis, we substituted each value on the scale
with the average value of the bracket. Subsequently, the income has been
transformed in real Euro of 2010 and converted in logarithm to normalize its
distribution.
Financial dissatisfaction is based on answers to the question: “how sat-
isfied are you with the financial situation of your household?”. The an-
swers range on a 10 points scale where higher scores indicate higher satis-
faction. Previous studies documented that, after accounting for personal in-
come, financial dissatisfaction correlates with measures of social deprivation
(D’Ambrosio and Frick, 2007, 2012). In other words, financial dissatisfac-
tion reflects respondents’ relative achievements, rather than absolute ones.
Hence, this variable can be regarded as a proxy for social comparisons. The
advantage of using a self-assessed measure of relative deprivation, rather than
defining reference groups and computing relative income, is that the former
solution does not hinge on any assumption about the composition of the refer-
ence group. Such an assumption is particularly stringent in our case because
few of the components of a reference group remain the same over large periods
of time. Letting people to decide to whom they compare their achievements
at each point in time and to evaluate their condition accordingly allows us to
overcome the limitations of the alternative solutions. Recent studies provided
additional evidence in support of the interpretation of financial dissatisfac-
tion: Brockmann et al. (2009) and Bartolini and Sarracino (2015) show that
financial dissatisfaction in China increased since 1990 despite a formidable
economic growth. This suggests that financial dissatisfaction reflects relative
rather than absolute concerns. Additionally, the growth of financial dissat-
isfaction emerged along with increasing income inequality: by widening the
differences between people, high income inequality increases the changes to
witness the living conditions of others and, therefore, to establish social com-
parisons. This can explain the association between financial dissatisfaction
(at micro level) and income inequality (at macro level). For the purposes of
the present study, we converted financial dissatisfaction in three dummies to
distinguish people with low satisfaction (those who chose the first three cat-
egories) from those with high satisfaction (those who chose the upper three
categories). The intermediate categories constitute the third dummy which
we use as reference category in the analysis.
We observe trust in others using a measure of generalized trust as adopted
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by Knack and Keefer (1997). Trust in others is measured with the answers
to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. Answers
are coded 1 if the respondent answers positively, 0 otherwise.
To account for individual heterogeneity, we include a set of socio-demographic
control variables such as gender, age, marital and employment status, and
the share of people reporting to have poor or very poor health. We also
account for respondents’ education including a control for the age at which
respondent finished his/her studies. We are aware that this is an imperfect
proxy of the education of the respondent, but other measures are not consis-
tently observed across the waves of the EVS. Table 3 summarizes the main
variables used in this study and it reports some descriptive statistics.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of European Values Study data for Italy in
1981 and 2005.
variable mean sd min max obs
satisfaction with life 6.763 2.194 1 10 2233
log income (real 2010 Euro) 9.942 0.649 7.988 12.25 1687
low financial dissatisfaction 0.352 0.478 0 1 2269
high financial dissatisfaction 0.182 0.386 0 1 2269
trust in others 0.278 0.448 0 1 2248
age 42.06 16.65 17 86 2294
age squared/100 20.46 14.89 2.890 73.96 2294
woman 0.505 0.500 0 1 2294
age education completed 17.04 5.980 4 80 2223
married 0.566 0.496 0 1 2294
divorced 0.00959 0.0975 0 1 2294
separated 0.0201 0.140 0 1 2294
widowed 0.0519 0.222 0 1 2294
part time 0.326 0.469 0 1 2294
retired 0.159 0.365 0 1 2294
housewife 0.158 0.365 0 1 2294
student 0.156 0.363 0 1 2294
unemployed 0.0789 0.270 0 1 2294
other 0.0567 0.231 0 1 2294
poor health 0.40 0.490 0 1 1979
year – – 1981 2005 2294
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4.1.2 European Quality of Life Survey (2003-2016)
Eurofund, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions, carries out the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS).
This is a collection of surveys administered regularly every four years since
2003. The surveys examine objective and subjective aspects of people’s lives,
including issues such as employment, income, education, housing, health,
work-life balance and well-being. In 2003 the survey covered 27 European
countries, and in 2016 it included all 28 European Union member states.
EQLS collects nationally representative, harmonized data across coun-
tries. This permits to track key trends in the quality of people’s lives over
time. The national samples include about 1000 respondents randomly drawn
from the adult population living in private households. Respondents are se-
lected using multi-stage, stratified, random sampling in each country. Inter-
views are conducted face-to-face using computer-assisted personal interview-
ing (CAPI).
The list of the considered variables mirrors the one used in the previous
section. Our dependent variable is life satisfaction, which ranges from 1
to 10 where higher scores indicate more satisfaction with life. The EQLS
provides also information about respondents’ happiness on a scale from 1 to
10. However, for the same reasons illustrated in the previous section, we
focus on life satisfaction (average figures about life satisfaction from EQLS
data are shown in figure 2).
Household income is measured through respondents’ declaration of their
own household income. The administrators of the survey harmonized this
variable providing the equivalized monthly income in real Euro of 2010. We
converted the household income in logarithm to normalize its distribution.
Similarly to the EVS, financial dissatisfaction is based on answers to the
following question: “Could you please tell me on a scale of 1 to 10 how
satisfied you are with each of the following items, where 1 means you are
very dissatisfied and 10 means you are very satisfied? Your present standard
of living”. We converted this variable in three dummies to distinguish people
with low satisfaction (those who chose the first three categories) from those
with high satisfaction (those who chose the upper three categories). The
intermediate categories constitute the third dummy which we use as reference
category in the analysis.
We observe trust in others with the answers to the question: “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of European Quality of Life Survey data for
Italy in 2003 and 2016.
Variable mean sd min max obs
life satisfaction (1 very dissatisfied, 10 very sa 6.753 1.749 1 10 2967
age 49.74 16.15 18 95 2976
age squared /100 27.35 16.69 3.240 90.25 2976
women 0.603 0.489 0 1 2976
married or living with partner 0.568 0.495 0 1 2975
separated or divorced and not living with 0.0914 0.288 0 1 2975
widowed and not living with partner 0.0982 0.298 0 1 2975
unemployed for less than 12 months 0.0165 0.127 0 1 2976
unemployed for more than 12 months 0.0316 0.175 0 1 2976
unable to work due to illness or disability 0.00370 0.0607 0 1 2976
retired 0.238 0.426 0 1 2976
homemaker 0.157 0.363 0 1 2976
student 0.0457 0.209 0 1 2976
upper secondary education 0.439 0.496 0 1 2966
tertiary education 0.171 0.376 0 1 2966
(log) equivalized monthly household income (real 2010 euro) 6.850 0.791 0.632 10.02 2243
low financial dissatisfaction 0.350 0.477 0 1 2973
high financial dissatisfaction 0.391 0.488 0 1 2973
high trust in others 0.298 0.458 0 1 2968
poor health 0.264 0.441 0 1 2973
year – – 2003 2016 2976
be too careful in dealing with people?”, which is the same wording used in
the EVS. Answers range from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you can’t be too
careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted. This variable has been
recoded into a dummy for comparability with the EVS. The new variable is
set equal to 1 if the respondent chose a score of 7 or higher (note that 7
corresponds to the 75th percentile of the distribution of trust), 0 otherwise.
Finally, we include a set of socio-demographic control variables such as
gender, age, marital and employment status, as well as the share of people
declaring to have poor or very poor health. We also account for respon-
dents’ education including a set of three dummies reflecting the educational
achievement of the respondent: primary, upper secondary, or tertiary. Table
4 provides summary statistics for the pooled 2003 and 2016 Italian samples.
5 Results
Panel A in Figure 3 shows the marginal effect of income on life satisfaction
in successive years (restricted model), i.e. the main result from equation
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1.10 The marginal effects in 1981 and 1990 are not statistically different
from zero, which suggests that in the period of economic expansion, differ-
ences of income among individuals are not correlated with differences of life
satisfaction. This relationship changes after the year 2000: when the trend
of the Italian economy changed sign, income turned out to be significantly
associated to life satisfaction. This evidence confirms the macro findings il-
lustrated in section 2: the changes in the association between income and
life satisfaction are consistent with the loss aversion hypothesis. Panel B in
Figure 3 shows the marginal effect of income on life satisfaction over time
after accounting for the effect of trust in others and financial dissatisfaction
(complete model). The results change compared to the restricted model,
but qualitatively they convey the same message: the importance of income
for well-being is negative and weakly significant in the period of economic
expansion, whereas it turns positive and significant after 2000.11.
Table 5 summarizes the results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.12
During the 1980s, on average Italians’ life satisfaction increased by 7.7 per-
centage points; it then lost 3.9 percentage points between 1990 and 2005,
and further 6 percentage points between 2003 and 2016. Hence, in the final
year of observation, Italians’ life satisfaction was basically at the same level
of 1981. The decomposition reveals that the Italian trajectory of life satis-
faction is the result of two transformations: one in the endowments of the
correlates of life satisfaction (the explained part of the decomposition), and
one in the magnitude of the association of each correlate with life satisfaction
(the unexplained part). As the coefficients reflect the association between in-
dependent variables and life satisfaction, we interpret them as people’s pref-
erences. Each of the two sides of the decomposition explains approximately
50% of the overall variation of life satisfaction in correspondence of the first
two structural breaks (1989 and 2005). In the last period, the explained part
predicts about two thirds (i.e. -0.40 points) of the life satisfaction gap (-0.60
points). In other words, the changes of Italians’ preferences play a minor
role in the last period compared to previous years. Put it differently, the
explained part of the decomposition, i.e. the part associated to the changes
in the levels of the explanatory variables, explains an increasing share of the
life satisfaction difference over time: from 47% in the first period, to 67% in
10The complete set of results from the OLS model is available in Appendix B.
11Tables with the complete set of results are available in Appendix B
12The detailed results from the decomposition are available in tables 14, 16 and 18 in
Appendices C and D.
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Figure 3: The association between income and life satisfaction is stronger in
the years when the Italian economy declines (2003 - onward), than before.
Panel A shows the marginal effects of income on life satisfaction after con-
trolling for the set of socio-demographic control variables (restricted model).
Panel B shows the results of the complete model, i.e. after adding trust in
others, financial dissatisfaction and subjective health.
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(b) Complete model.
Note: average marginal effects after OLS regression with sample weight and
clustered standard errors by year. The complete list of control variables is
available in section 4.1.
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Table 5: Summary of the results from the decomposition.
EVS EVS EQLS
1981-1990 1990-2005 2003-2016
LS difference 0.77∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗
explained part 0.36∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗
unexplained part 0.41∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗
Observations 2322 1913 2243
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
Estimates use sample weights and clustered standard errors by year.
the last period.
Hence, a generalized impoverishment of the correlates of well-being ex-
plains the declining trajectory of life satisfaction in Italy. Impoverishment
of what, exactly? Results from the decomposition document that since
1990 Italians experience a pattern of declining social relationships, worsen-
ing health conditions, and increasing financial dissatisfaction. These changes
allow us to explain the variation of life satisfaction along with the role of
income. More in detail, between 1981 and 1990 the share of people report-
ing poor health decreased from 49% to 43.6%; financial dissatisfaction was
fairly low: highly dissatisfied people decreased from 25% to 11%, whereas
those reporting low levels of dissatisfaction increased from 34% to 47% (see
table 6 for detailed figures). These changes are associated to increasing life
satisfaction because of increasing average income and of limited income in-
equality that characterized the 1980s. Moreover, in the same period, social
relations improved: the share of people trusting others increased from 24%
to 35.5%, while the share of divorced and separated people did not change
significantly. These two changes contributed to increasing average well-being
between 1981 and 1990.
This picture changes in the 1990s and worsens after 2000: the stagnating
life satisfaction is the net result of contrasting forces. On one side, improv-
ing health conditions (the share of people with poor health declined from
43.6% to 27.5%); on the other, the negative impact of increasing financial
dissatisfaction. Between 1990 and 2005, the share of people trusting others
did not change significantly, although the share of divorced and separated
people nearly doubled (divorced: from 1.6% to 2.2%; separated: from 1.7%
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Table 6: Share of people reporting poor health, high and low financial dis-
satisfaction and trusting others by year.
Variable 1981a 1990a 2003b 2005a 2016b
poor health 49% 43.6% 14.5% 27.5% 33%
high financial dissatisfaction 25% 11% 31.9% 14.4% 42.87%
low financial dissatisfaction 34% 47% 40.5% 31.4% 30.2%
trust in others 24% 35.5% 36.7% 34.2% 25.9%
Note:
a data sourced from EVS. b data sourced from EQLS.
The percentages represent the share of respondents in the sample. Weighted data.
to 4.2%). In the same period the share of people declaring low financial dis-
satisfaction went from 47% to 31.4%, whereas the highly dissatisfied people
went from 11.8% to 14.4%. Our results indicate that the net result for life
satisfaction of these forces acting in opposite directions is negative.
The social changes that took place in 1990s continued after 2000s: the
worsening of social, health, and economic conditions explain the loss of nearly
half a point of life satisfaction between 2003 and 2016. People declaring to be
in poor health doubled (from 14.5% to 33%), those declaring to trust others
went from 36.7% to 25.9%, while average income declined, and financial
dissatisfaction increased: in 2016 the share of people highly dissatisfied with
their financial situation was 42.7%.
Financial dissatisfaction requires some attention. Previous studies doc-
umented that financial dissatisfaction in a country correlates with income
inequality (Brockmann et al., 2009; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015). The idea
is that the chances for distressing interpersonal comparisons – and therefore
to be dissatisfied with own financial conditions – increase in a society with
high inequality. The case of Italy confirms this evidence. Figure 4 shows
that the increase in life satisfaction between 1981 and 1990 is associated to a
declining trend of the Gini index (notice that this association extends to the
period before 1981). 13 After 1990, however, income inequality increases and,
correspondingly, life satisfaction begins its declining trajectory. The sudden
increase of income inequality, which continues beyond 2005, contributes to
13The trend of income inequality is confirmed if we use the standard deviation of income
as a measure of income inequality (see figure 5 in Appendix E). The standard deviation
of income is computed by year on EVS and EQLS samples.
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explaining the decline of life satisfaction and the decoupling between eco-
nomic growth and life satisfaction (Oishi and Kesebir, 2015; Mikucka et al.,
2017).
Figure 4: Life satisfaction and income inequality.
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Note: Gini index of disposable income is issued from the Standardized
World Income Inequality Database v.7.1 (Solt, 2016). To illustrate the
trends of life satisfaction and income inequality, we reported the data since
1975. Figures on life satisfaction between 1975 and 1980 are issued from the
Eurobarometer and they are not included in our analysis because this
dataset does not include the variables necessary for our analysis.
In sum, the change of Italians’ life satisfaction over the last 35 years
seems largely due to the fact that Italians got less of what matters for life
satisfaction: less health, less trust in others, less income and more financial
dissatisfaction. The negative impact of these changes on life satisfaction
are reinforced by changes in Italians’ preferences, which – however – play a
diminishing role in explaining the life satisfaction gap over time. The changes
in preferences concern basically income and age.
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Over time, Italians’ preference for income increases: in 1981 income at-
tracted a negative coefficient, indicating that – ceteris paribus – richer people
were less satisfied with their lives than poorer ones. This surprising result can
be explained by the inclusion of financial dissatisfaction among the control
variables. Financial dissatisfaction reflects respondents’ relative deprivation,
i.e. it is a measure of how the respondents fare compared to others in eco-
nomic terms. If financial dissatisfaction attracts a large, negative coefficient
– indicating that individual i life satisfaction correlates negatively with oth-
ers’ income – then it is possible that the overall impact of absolute income is
positive, yet it attracts a negative coefficient.14 This seems to be the case in
Italy before 2000s: if we exclude financial dissatisfaction from the regression,
income attracts a positive coefficient. After 2000s, the coefficient of income
is positive also after controlling for financial dissatisfaction. These changes
result in positive variations in life satisfaction. However, these changes di-
minish with time as a consequence of declining average income. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis of loss aversion: when income becomes scarce,
its association with well-being increases.
The relationship with age predicts negative changes of life satisfaction in
the 1980s and positive ones in the years after 2000. This evidence suggests
that aging contributed to life satisfaction in 1981, but not after 1990. The
reason for this surprising result is that in 1981 the coefficient of age was
positive, thus suggesting that elderly people fared well with their lives. How-
ever, as of 1990, the coefficient turned weakly negative. This may indicate
that something has changed in the life of elderly people as a consequence,
for instance, of a more expensive health care system, higher exposure to risk
of poverty, and/or higher social isolation. The changes in the coefficients of
the remaining explanatory variables do not predict any significant change in
life satisfaction.
The results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition confirm the expla-
nation in terms of loss aversion, and they add further details to explain the
trajectory of life satisfaction in Italy. In particular, they reveal a pattern of
generalized material and social impoverishment.
14More formally, if financial dissatisfaction (F ) depends on others’ income (Y o) so that
F = Y o − Y , then the life satisfaction regression can be written as: LS = α + β · Y − γ ·
(Y o−Y )+ε which is equivalent to: LS = α+(β+γ) ·Y −γ ·Y o+ε so that the coefficient
of income (θ = β + γ) is positive even if β < 0, provided that γ > β . This is true in our
regressions in which financial dissatisfaction attracts large coefficients.
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6 Conclusion
One of the challenges of using Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
as a reliable measure of population’s well-being is the presence of structural
breaks in the long-run trends of GDP and subjective well-being, as well as
in their relationship – also called well-being-income gradient. The problem
of structural breaks has so far been overlooked in the controversies that
revolve around this gradient, thus implicitly endorsing the assumption that
the trends of GDP and subjective well-being are stable in the long run.
Instead, structural breaks are at odds with the evidence provided by both
supporters and opponents of GDP as a measure of well-being. In fact, the
first ones claim that the gradient is universally positive and stable; the second
ones defend the hypothesis that the trend of subjective well-being is flat
irrespective of economic growth.
In this paper we claim that structural breaks in the trends of GDP and
subjective well-being, and in the gradient may exist within the same country,
and that a case of special interest is when the GDP trend reverses the sign.
By using both macro and micro data, we provide evidence to identify possible
explanations for these phenomena. Our results support scholars who claim
that the question is not whether GDP is a good measure of well-being, but
under which conditions this applies. To illustrate our point, we focused on
Italy, a most interesting case because its recent history can be characterized
by three phases: the 1970s and 1980s, when the economy grew along with
well-being to approach levels similar to other Western European countries;
the 1990s when, despite economic growth, the well-being stops growing; the
years after 2000, when the economy slows down, well-being begins an unin-
terrupted (to date) decline, and Italy deviates from the growing trends of
other countries.
Our analysis provided a number of results. First, Italy’s gradient and the
underlying long-run trends of GDP and of well-being exhibit two structural
breaks over time: the gradient is positive when both GDP and well-being
are growing, then it is virtually zero when economic growth decelerates and
the trend of well-being is flat, and it finally becomes again positive, but
when both GDP and well-being are declining. The principle of ‘diminishing
marginal utility of income’ cannot explain this pattern, because, at least,
Italy’s well-being falls below that of the European core countries after suc-
cessfully catching up. The second result regards the asymmetry of the gradi-
ent, as it increases when both GDP and well-being decline. This asymmetry
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is consistent with the behavioural interpretation of ‘loss aversion’.
The application of regressions with interaction effects, and of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition to micro data, issued from the European Values Study
and the European Quality of Life Survey, strengthened our findings, and
provided new ones. In fact, the third result is that people’s preferences over
income increase when the latter declines. The fourth result indicates that
other factors are important in accounting for structural breaks. In particular,
declining trust in others, worsening subjective health, and increasing finan-
cial dissatisfaction – the micro counterpart of economic inequality – are the
main factors that contribute to explain why the well-being-income gradient
increases when the trends decline.
The results from the macro- and micro-analysis are consistent with the
historical analysis of the parabola of the Italian economy. The shocks that
could explain why economic growth turned into a long-run decline might
have increased people’s uncertainty about the future, and worsened their
perception of the social context, thus especially depressing their subjective
well-being.
Our results indicate that both the well-being-income gradient and the
slope of the trend of well-being can be positive, zero, or even negative. This
evidence suggests that we should move from the general law of one gradi-
ent over time, and of the flat trend in well-being, toward the research of
other factors that may condition the gradient, and of their change in the
long run. This further suggests that the interpretation of asymmetry of the
gradient based on people’s ‘loss aversion’ should be enriched to account for
the change of contextual factors, especially when the analysis focuses on long
time periods.
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A Appendix
Table 7: The gradient between life satisfaction and the trend-component of
real GDP per capita in three sub-periods of the 1973-2016 period in Italy.
Time period Gradient between life satisfaction and
the trend-component of real GDP
per capita
(times 100)
1973-1989 0.32∗∗∗
1989-2005 0.01
2005-2016 1.01∗∗∗
1973-2016 0.23∗∗∗
Notes: The results are obtained as coefficients of the regressions of the
index of life satisfaction against the trend-component of the logarithm of
real GDP per capita, having controlled for its cyclical-component. The
structural break between the first and the second sub-period is made
evident by Wald test=17.99 (p=0.0004). The structural break between the
second and the third sub-period is made evident by Wald test=62.14
(p=0.0000). For further Notes and Sources see Table 1. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
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Table 8: Test of structural break in the relationship between life satisfaction
and real GDP per capita in the period 1973-2016 in the countries of Europe-8.
Countries Wald test Break year
Belgium 40.0∗∗∗(upward) 1982
Denmark 6.1(upward) 1990
France 28.3∗∗∗(upward) 1989
Germany 67.7∗∗∗(upward) 1997
Ireland 51.7∗∗∗(upward) 1989
Luxembourg 15.0∗∗(upward) 1980
Netherland 13.1∗∗(upward) 2002
United Kingdom 27.5∗∗∗(upward) 2009
Notes: The results are obtained as coefficients of the regressions of, respec-
tively, the index of life satisfaction against years (I column), the logarithm of
real GDP per capita against years (II column), the index of life satisfaction
against the logarithm of real GDP per capita (III column). Real GDP per
capita is at purchasing power parity in constant 2011 U.S. dollars. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance at the ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
Sources: Elaborations on data from Eurobarometer, and Maddison Project
Database (Bolt et al., 2018).
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Table 9: The trends of life satisfaction, of real GDP per capita, and of the
gradient between life satisfaction and real GDP per capita in three sub-
periods of the 1973-2016 period in Europe-8 (Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherland, and the United Kingdom).
Time period Annual changes of Annual growth rate Gradient between life
the proportion of of real GDP per capita satisfaction and real GDP
people ‘very’ and ‘fairly’ per capita
satisfied with life
1973-1989 0.0006 1.86∗∗∗ 0.04
1989-2005 -0.0007 1.73∗∗∗ -0.02
2005-2016 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
1973-2016 0.0017∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
Notes: The results are obtained as coefficients of the regressions of, respec-
tively, the index of life satisfaction against years (I column), the logarithm of
real GDP per capita against years (II column), the index of life satisfaction
against the logarithm of real GDP per capita (III column). Real GDP per
capita is at purchasing power parity in constant 2011 U.S. dollars. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance at the ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
Sources: Elaborations on data from Eurobarometer, and Maddison Project
Database.
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Table 10: The trends of life satisfaction, of per capita GDP, and of the
gradient of life satisfaction with respect of per capita GDP in two sub-periods
in Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
Time period Annual changes of Annual growth rate Gradient between life
the proportion of of real GDP per capita satisfaction and real GDP
people ‘very’ and ‘fairly’ per capita
satisfied with life (times 100)
Greece
1981-2009 -0.0004 1.89∗∗∗ 0.01
2009-2016 -0.0063 -2.28∗∗∗ 0.27∗◦
1981-2016 -0.0058∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ -0.07
Spain
1981-2008 0.0073∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
2008-2016 -0.0051 -0.99∗ 0.87∗∗
1981-2016 0.0016 2.19∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
Portugal
1985-2007 -0.0038∗ 2.63∗∗∗ -0.09
2007-2016 -0.0032 -0.05∗ 2.26∗∗◦
1985-2016 -0.0079∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗
Notes: The results are obtained as coefficients of the regressions of, respec-
tively, the index of life satisfaction against years (I column), the logarithm of
real GDP per capita against years (II column), the index of life satisfaction
against the logarithm of real GDP per capita (III column). Real GDP per
capita is at purchasing power parity in constant 2011 U.S. dollars. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance at the ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%. The symbol
◦ reminds us that the positive gradient is due to the decline of both life
satisfaction and real GDP per capita.
Sources: Elaborations on data from Eurobarometer, and Maddison Project
Database (Bolt et al., 2018).
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Table 11: OLS regression of life satisfaction over income, year, and their
interaction. The first two columns report the results for the restricted model,
i.e. income is the main explanatory variable, whereas the last two columns
report the results from the complete model, in which we account also for
trust in others, financial dissatisfaction and subjective health. In both cases,
we use sample weights and robust standard errors clustered by year.
Restricted model Complete model
EVS EQLS EVS EQLS
age −0.00927 −0.0587∗∗ 0.000536 −0.0446∗∗
(−0.26) (−5.77) (0.02) (−3.67)
age squared/100 −0.00110 0.0512∗∗∗ −0.00685 0.0436∗∗
(−0.02) (7.72) (−0.19) (4.67)
woman −0.117 0.0600 −0.157∗ 0.0959∗∗∗
(−1.48) (1.76) (−3.69) (6.43)
years of education (yes) (yes)
education (dummies) (yes) (yes)
marital status (dummies) (yes) (yes) (yes) (yes)
occupational status (dummies) (yes) (yes) (yes) (yes)
year = 1981 (reference) (reference)
year = 1990 1.848∗ −0.601
(3.30) (−2.33)
year = 2003 (reference) (reference)
year = 2005 −1.936 −3.070∗∗
(−2.49) (−6.39)
year = 2007 −0.392 −1.869∗∗∗
(−1.35) (−6.38)
year = 2011 0.183 −0.554∗∗
(1.07) (−4.07)
year = 2016 −0.766∗ −1.179∗∗
(−2.68) (−3.80)
income 0.0815 0.342∗∗∗ −0.347∗ 0.0473
(0.66) (6.72) (−4.28) (1.15)
year = 1990 × income −0.109 0.109∗
(−1.93) (4.23)
year = 2005 × income 0.225∗ 0.333∗∗
(2.94) (7.33)
year = 2007 × income −0.00605 0.235∗∗
(−0.15) (5.73)
year = 2011 × income −0.0731∗ 0.0567∗
(−2.97) (2.91)
year = 2016 × income 0.0494 0.133∗∗
(1.31) (3.31)
trust in others (dummy) 0.300∗∗
(7.07)
trust in others (low) (reference)
(1.56)
trust in others (medium) 0.164
(1.56)
trust in others (high) 0.503∗∗
(3.61)
financial dissatisfaction = fair −1.207∗∗ 0.0854
(−9.08) (0.78)
financial dissatisfaction = high −2.120∗∗∗ −1.575∗∗∗
(−25.06) (−9.06)
perceived health = poor −0.742∗∗ −0.352∗∗∗
(−7.46) (−5.90)
Constant 5.342∗∗∗ 5.703∗∗∗ 10.78∗∗∗ 7.782∗∗∗
(12.77) (52.68) (93.58) (36.98)
Observations 2912 4165 2912 4165
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Table 12: OLS regression of life satisfaction over income, year, and their
interaction: detailed results from the restricted model. Column 2 reports
the results for the pooled EVS sample, whereas column 3 reports the results
for the EQLS sample. In both cases, we use sample weights and robust
standard errors clustered by year.
EVS EQLS
age −0.00927 (−0.26) −0.0587∗∗ (−5.77)
age squared/100 −0.00110 (−0.02) 0.0512∗∗∗ (7.72)
woman −0.117 (−1.48) 0.0600 (1.76)
years of education 0.0157 (2.08)
upper secondary education 0.425∗∗ (4.21)
tertiary education 0.591∗∗ (4.56)
married 0.555∗ (3.81) 0.424∗∗ (5.63)
divorced −0.813 (−1.27) −0.288∗ (−2.63)
separated −0.963∗ (−3.88)
widowed 0.0233 (0.23) −0.144 (−1.29)
part time 0.373∗ (3.98)
retired 0.593 (2.26) 0.248 (1.22)
homemaker 0.368 (1.08) −0.0353 (−0.56)
student 0.367∗∗ (7.19) 0.0802 (0.38)
unemployed 0.549 (2.65)
unemployed (less than 12 months) −0.551 (−2.23)
unemployed (more than 12 months) −1.389∗∗∗ (−8.55)
other −0.775∗∗ (−7.48)
sick or disabled −1.903∗∗∗ (−7.71)
year = 1981 (reference)
year = 1990 1.848∗ (3.30)
year = 2003 (reference)
year = 2005 −1.936 (−2.49)
year = 2007 −0.392 (−1.35)
year = 2011 0.183 (1.07)
year = 2016 −0.766∗ (−2.68)
income 0.0815 (0.66) 0.342∗∗∗ (6.72)
year = 1990 × income −0.109 (−1.93)
year = 2005 × income 0.225∗ (2.94)
year = 2007 × income −0.00605 (−0.15)
year = 2011 × income −0.0731∗ (−2.97)
year = 2016 × income 0.0494 (1.31)
Constant 5.342∗∗∗ (12.77) 5.703∗∗∗ (52.68)
Observations 2912 4165
Adj. R2 0.065 0.114
35
Table 13: OLS regression of life satisfaction over income, year, and their
interaction: detailed results from the complete model. Column 2 reports the
results for the pooled EVS sample, whereas column 3 reports the results for
the EQLS sample. In both cases, we use sample weights and robust standard
errors clustered by year.
EVS EQLS
age 0.000536 (0.02) −0.0446∗∗ (−3.67)
age squared/100 −0.00685 (−0.19) 0.0436∗∗ (4.67)
woman −0.157∗ (−3.69) 0.0959∗∗∗ (6.43)
years of education 0.00905 (2.03)
upper secondary education 0.114 (1.34)
tertiary education 0.147 (0.95)
married 0.573∗∗ (7.58) 0.246 (2.03)
divorced −0.559 (−0.96) −0.158 (−1.58)
separated −0.649 (−1.71)
widowed 0.0345 (0.35) −0.163 (−1.45)
part time 0.229 (2.12)
retired 0.332 (2.09) 0.176 (0.94)
homemaker 0.175 (0.66) 0.0212 (0.71)
student 0.273∗∗ (6.31) −0.0896 (−0.59)
unemployed 0.311∗ (3.31)
unemployed (less than 12 months) −0.183 (−0.67)
unemployed (more than 12 months) −0.796∗∗∗ (−6.14)
other −0.723∗∗ (−5.17)
sick or disabled −1.156∗∗ (−3.88)
year = 1981 (reference)
year = 1990 −0.601 (−2.33)
year = 2003 (reference)
year = 2005 −3.070∗∗ (−6.39)
year = 2007 −1.869∗∗∗ (−6.38)
year = 2011 −0.554∗∗ (−4.07)
year = 2016 −1.179∗∗ (−3.80)
income −0.347∗ (−4.28) 0.0473 (1.15)
year = 1990 × lnrealeuro 0.109∗ (4.23)
year = 2005 × lnrealeuro 0.333∗∗ (7.33)
year = 2007 × Scale of incomes 0.235∗∗ (5.73)
year = 2011 × Scale of incomes 0.0567∗ (2.91)
year = 2016 × Scale of incomes 0.133∗∗ (3.31)
trust in others (dummy) 0.300∗∗ (7.07)
trust in others (low) (reference)
trust in others (medium) 0.164 (1.56)
trust in others (high) 0.503∗∗ (3.61)
financial dissatisfaction = fair −1.207∗∗ (−9.08) 0.0854 (0.78)
financial dissatisfaction = high −2.120∗∗∗ (−25.06) −1.575∗∗∗ (−9.06)
perceived health = poor −0.742∗∗ (−7.46) −0.352∗∗∗ (−5.90)
Constant 10.78∗∗∗ (93.58) 7.782∗∗∗ (36.98)
Observations 2912 4165
Adj. R2 0.221 0.331
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Table 14: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap betwen 1981
and 1990.
Decomposition Detailed decomposition
Explained Unexplained
avg. life satisfaction in 1990 7.320∗∗∗
(8.31e+ 14)
avg. life satisfaction in 1981 6.553∗∗∗
(2.05e+ 15)
difference 0.768∗∗∗
(1.29e+ 14)
explained part 0.359∗∗∗
(23.08)
unexplained part 0.409∗∗∗
(26.29)
age 0.00782 −1.343∗∗∗
(0.42) (−72.55)
woman 0.000477∗∗ −0.0464∗∗∗
(3.16) (−307.98)
education (# of years) 0.0496 −0.395∗∗∗
(1.55) (−12.34)
married 0.000284∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗
(4.84) (−2831.37)
divorced −0.0142 0.0394∗∗∗
(−1.19) (3.31)
widowed −0.00116∗∗∗ −0.00108∗∗∗
(−23.38) (−21.73)
part-time 0.0170 −0.134∗∗∗
(1.59) (−12.50)
retired −0.0161 −0.0709∗∗∗
(−0.98) (−4.30)
houseworker 0.00165 −0.157∗∗∗
(0.47) (−44.56)
student −0.0130∗∗ −0.0490∗∗∗
(−2.77) (−10.44)
unemployed 0.00282∗∗∗ −0.0111∗∗∗
(5.03) (−19.91)
other −0.00631∗∗∗ −0.00133∗∗∗
(−40.65) (−8.59)
income −0.0440∗∗ 3.243∗∗∗
(−2.10) (154.61)
low financial dissatisfaction 0.173∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗
(57.80) (7.18)
high financial dissatisfaction 0.122∗∗∗ −0.00826
(21.20) (−1.44)
trust in others 0.0350∗∗∗ −0.0180∗∗∗
(6.84) (−3.52)
poor health 0.0440∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(5.40) (13.52)
Constant −0.603∗∗∗
(−2.24e+ 12)
Observations 2322
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 15: β coefficients and X-values for 1981 and 1990.
Coefficients Averages
β1990 β1981 βreference X1990 X1981
age −0.037 0.041 0.014 45.719 45.862
age squared/100 0.040 −0.053 −0.019 23.680 24.207
woman −0.206 −0.114 −0.160 0.503 0.506
education (# of years) 0.008 0.032 0.026 16.644 14.761
married 0.456 0.718 0.577 0.636 0.635
divorced −0.435 −3.183 −0.921 0.016 0.005
separated −0.433 −1.822 −0.929 0.017 0.012
widowed 0.035 0.056 0.130 0.082 0.091
part time 0.150 0.548 0.219 0.402 0.324
retired 0.115 0.692 0.222 0.064 0.136
housewife −0.139 0.610 0.155 0.216 0.206
student 0.216 0.435 0.211 0.161 0.222
unemployed 0.197 0.440 0.295 0.051 0.042
other −0.824 −0.780 −0.829 0.039 0.032
income −0.167 −0.498 −0.261 9.908 9.739
low financial dissatisfaction 1.324 1.254 1.342 0.470 0.341
high financial dissatisfaction −0.893 −0.873 −0.919 0.118 0.251
trust in others 0.249 0.296 0.307 0.355 0.241
poor health −0.608 −0.847 −0.747 0.436 0.495
Constant 9.032 9.635 8.364 1.000 1.000
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Table 16: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap betwen 1990
and 2005.
Decomposition Detailed decomposition
Explained Unexplained
avg. life satisfaction in 2005 6.927∗∗∗
(1.40e+ 16)
avg. life satisfaction in 1990 7.320∗∗∗
(2.70e+ 15)
difference −0.393∗∗∗
(−1.46e+ 14)
explained part −0.229∗∗∗
(−5.09)
unexplained part −0.165∗∗∗
(−3.66)
age −0.0166∗∗∗ −0.00454∗∗∗
(−26.92) (−7.35)
woman 0.00117∗∗∗ 0.0411∗∗∗
(5.49) (192.03)
education (# of years) 0.0153∗∗ −0.0669∗∗∗
(1.97) (−8.60)
married −0.0320∗∗∗ 0.0735∗∗∗
(−6.51) (14.97)
divorced −0.0104∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗
(−2.47) (5.05)
widowed −0.000584 −0.0191∗∗∗
(−0.28) (−9.25)
part-time −0.00777∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗
(−9.79) (17.80)
retired 0.0167∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗
(2.34) (3.31)
houseworker 0.000963 0.0959∗∗∗
(0.59) (58.30)
student −0.0237∗∗ 0.0200∗∗
(−2.53) (2.14)
unemployed 0.00111∗∗∗ 0.00307∗∗∗
(17.24) (47.47)
other −0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗
(−4.40) (5.59)
income −0.0390∗ 2.298∗∗∗
(−1.77) (104.36)
low financial dissatisfaction −0.189∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗
(−6.59) (−6.78)
high financial dissatisfaction −0.0253∗∗∗ −0.0193∗∗∗
(−10.24) (−7.81)
trust in others −0.00364∗∗∗ 0.0538∗∗∗
(−4.36) (64.43)
poor health 0.100∗∗∗ −0.0484∗∗∗
(22.02) (−10.63)
Constant −2.478∗∗∗
(−3.48e+ 13)
Observations 1913
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 17: β coefficients and X-values for 1990 and 2005.
Coefficients Averages
β2005 β1990 βreference X2005 X1990
age −0.023 −0.037 −0.041 45.720 45.719
age squared/100 0.012 0.040 0.041 23.278 23.680
woman −0.124 −0.206 −0.180 0.497 0.503
education (# of years) 0.004 0.008 0.004 20.147 16.644
married 0.577 0.456 0.525 0.575 0.636
divorced 0.280 −0.435 −0.122 0.022 0.016
separated −0.227 −0.433 −0.382 0.042 0.017
widowed −0.368 0.035 0.016 0.046 0.082
part time 0.189 0.150 0.153 0.351 0.402
retired 0.288 0.115 0.164 0.166 0.064
housewife 0.328 −0.139 −0.074 0.203 0.216
student 0.417 0.216 0.276 0.075 0.161
unemployed 0.248 0.197 0.182 0.058 0.051
other −0.444 −0.824 −0.699 0.063 0.039
income 0.059 −0.167 −0.122 10.226 9.908
low financial dissatisfaction 0.766 1.324 1.203 0.314 0.470
high financial dissatisfaction −1.041 −0.893 −0.974 0.144 0.118
trust in others 0.404 0.249 0.297 0.342 0.355
poor health −0.776 −0.608 −0.622 0.275 0.436
Constant 6.554 9.032 8.720 1.000 1.000
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Table 18: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap between 2003
and 2016.
Decomposition Detailed decomposition
Explained Unexplained
avg. life satisfaction in 2016 6.568∗∗∗
(1.30e+ 15)
avg. life satisfaction in 2003 7.163∗∗∗
(4.56e+ 15)
difference −0.596∗∗∗
(−9.13e+ 13)
explained part −0.403∗∗∗
(−8.61)
unexplained part −0.192∗∗∗
(−4.11)
age −0.00192 1.114∗∗∗
(−0.05) (28.05)
woman −0.00217∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
(−8.67) (86.51)
married 0.000235 −0.135∗∗∗
(0.77) (−440.14)
divorced 0.00201∗∗∗ −0.00915∗∗∗
(4.34) (−19.78)
widowed −0.000341 −0.0453∗∗∗
(−1.20) (−159.34)
unemployed (less than 6 months) −0.00667 0.0274∗∗∗
(−0.89) (3.66)
unemployed (more than 6 months) −0.0222∗∗∗ 0.00998∗∗∗
(−6.79) (3.06)
other −0.00886∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗
(−2.95) (6.37)
retired 0.00482 −0.154∗∗∗
(0.44) (−14.03)
educational achievement 0.00377 0.0940∗∗∗
(1.29) (32.17)
income −0.0549∗∗∗ 1.385∗∗∗
(−4.83) (121.88)
low financial dissatisfaction −0.0868∗∗∗ 0.00622∗∗∗
(−155.52) (11.13)
high financial dissatisfaction −0.111∗∗∗ −0.0466∗∗∗
(−16.79) (−7.07)
high trust in others −0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗
(−21.47) (8.09)
poor health −0.0607∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗
(−2.77) (2.49)
Constant −2.557∗∗∗
(−1.07e+ 13)
Observations 2243
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 19: β coefficients and X-values for 2003 and 2016.
Coefficients Averages
β2016 β2003 βreference X2016 X2003
age −0.026 −0.052 −0.033 51.296 47.226
age squared /100 0.032 0.038 0.031 29.409 25.208
woman 0.116 0.076 0.106 0.518 0.539
married 0.007 0.235 0.070 0.595 0.592
divorced −0.332 −0.178 −0.281 0.055 0.062
widowed −0.456 0.009 −0.272 0.098 0.097
unemployed (less than 12 months) −0.133 −1.865 −0.442 0.028 0.013
unemployed (more than 12 months) −0.788 −1.149 −0.882 0.046 0.021
sick or disabled −1.435 −3.353 −1.553 0.004 0.001
retired −0.101 0.510 0.125 0.276 0.238
home maker 0.033 0.052 0.076 0.126 0.175
student 0.025 −0.269 −0.098 0.066 0.061
upper secondary education 0.290 0.189 0.216 0.429 0.426
tertiary education 0.385 0.028 0.225 0.150 0.137
income 0.182 −0.016 0.168 6.718 7.045
low financial dissatisfaction 0.825 0.813 0.837 0.302 0.405
high financial dissatisfaction −1.062 −0.929 −1.024 0.427 0.319
high trust in others 0.565 0.499 0.549 0.259 0.367
poor health −0.230 −0.484 −0.326 0.331 0.145
Constant 5.739 8.296 6.243 1.000 1.000
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E Standard deviation of income as a measure
of inequality
Figure 5: The Gini index follows closely the trajectory of the standard devi-
ation of income.
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World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2016). The standard deviation of
income is computed using survey data from the EVS and the EQLS.
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